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The paper is a revised version of  the first in a series of  twelve lectures on Hungarian 
history at the University of  Vienna, starting on October 5, 2017. It discusses some 
key issues of  Hungarian history around the theme of  continuities and discontinuities. 
Namely, a particular dynamism of  Hungarian history derives from the incongruence 
between the historical narrative of  the Hungarian state and the historical narrative 
of  the Hungarian nation for extended periods during the last thousand years. The 
survey addresses political, social, economic and cultural aspects of  Hungarian history 
and concludes by arguing that the adoption of  Christianity and the foundation of  the 
Hungarian state by the first king, Saint Stephen, are the longest-lasting achievements of  
Hungarian history, properly commemorated by the most important national holiday on 
August 20. 
Keywords: Hungary, geopolitics, frontier experiences, periodization, continuity, 
discontinuity
* The original talk was entitled “Ungarn in Europa. Tausend Jahre an der Grenze” and it includes much 
from our previous publications. We would like to thank Professor Oliver Schmid (Austria), Iván Bertényi 
Jr., Deputy Director of  the Collegium Hungaricum in Vienna, and Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics, research 
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This is the first time for many years that the University of  Vienna has hosted a 
series of  lectures by Hungarian historians. We are very glad and greatly honored 
to be delivering the introductory talk of  the series, although a general introduction 
to Hungarian history is not an easy undertaking. To stir up your attention before 
we start, we would like to share with you a whimsical line of  thought. 
As we all know, there are times when some small details diverts the course 
of  history from what might otherwise have been expected. We have played with 
a speculative, and admittedly slightly tendentious, idea that starts with Matthias 
Corvinus’s capture of  Vienna in 1485. Let us suppose that he did not die five 
years later, but lived until, say, 1505. In the meantime, he fathered an heir or 
had his illegitimate son’s right of  inheritance recognized, and the House of  
Hunyadi stabilized its control of  the whole of  Austria and Central Europe for 
many centuries. The Ottoman threat would have made Vienna the center of  
the Hungarian empire, and its population (like those of  East Austria) would 
gradually have been Magyarized in language and custom. In 2016, a professor 
of  the highest institution of  Hungarian education, the University of  Vienna, has 
the idea of  running a series of  lectures on Austrian history, a subject that rarely 
appears on the syllabus. After all, he says, the Austrians used to make up half  
of  the common empire and the Hungarians are not taught much about them. 
The talks will of  course be presented in Hungarian, so that the students can 
understand. So you would now be speaking in Hungarian about your “neglected 
history” to us, the Hungarians of  Vienna. A bizarre idea, but things could quite 
easily have turned out that way. And I think it underlines the need to know each 
other better. We are therefore very grateful for the chance to talk about ourselves.
Two Narratives
The first difficulty we encounter shows up one of  the idiosyncrasies of  Hungarian 
history: it is actually two histories. One is of  the Hungarian people, and the other 
of  the Hungarian state. What makes our task particularly difficult is that Hungary 
has never been inhabited by Hungarians alone, and many Hungarians lived, and 
still do, outside its borders. Our history takes on a special dynamic from the 
congruencies and divergences of  these two narratives through the centuries. In 
the Middle Ages, Hungary was regarded as a great power, but for 150 years starting 
in the middle of  the sixteenth century, it was divided into three parts. Hungarian 
statehood found its place within the Habsburg Monarchy, and after the First 
World War, Hungarians first got a taste of  being a small state. Interruptions and 
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fundamental reorganizations have constantly attended the life of  Hungarians. In 
the twentieth century alone, we have gone through nine changes in the form of  
state or the political system. In other words, every twentieth-century generation 
has had to get used to at least three or four different systems, not to mention 
occasional shifts within the system. Nonetheless, despite historical changes that 
have become increasingly frequent as we approach the present, it is long-term 
continuity that is most important. Where should we seek the beginnings of  these 
changes and continuities?
Which Part of  Europe Does Hungary Belong To?
The oriental ethnic group that became known as the Hungarians formed in 
the first millennium BC. From being hunters and fishers, they became horse-
riding nomads herding large animals on the steppe, and subsequently settled as 
farmers. They migrated from their original homeland beyond the Urals to the 
South Russian-Ukrainian steppe and, during the ninth century (some say partly 
in the fifth and sixth centuries), to their present homeland. Originally a Finno-
Ugrian people, they had acquired Turkish material culture, music and faith (of  
which a memory is their most widespread foreign name: Onogur→vengerski, 
Ungarn, Hungarian, hongrois), when they came to their final homeland. 
Throughout all of  these metamorphoses, the basic characteristics that made 
them a people displayed an unparalleled continuity. Over three thousand years, 
they have managed to retain their system of  symbols (above all the language) 
and distinguish and separate themselves from other peoples, as manifested in 
their enduring name for themselves, Magyar. (In modern German usage, Ungarn 
usually denotes the country, and Magyaren/Madjaren the people.) Only one or 
two other former steppe peoples can boast such an achievement.
Upon their conquest of  the Carpathian Basin, the Hungarians found 
themselves in the geographical center of  Europe, and started to participate in 
Western, or European, civilization. This civilization has been summed up by the 
French philosopher Rémy Brague as essentially consisting of  Roman roots and 
an emerging Latinity, and Latin Christianity. The essence of  this “Roman model” 
is continuous renewal through the rediscovery and reinterpretation of  old 
cultural heritage and the passing on of  old traditions to the constantly-changing 
present. Consequently, the history of  Europe is a series of  renaissances, through 
which it has constantly expanded territorially and intellectually and developed 
unparalleled abilities of  self-reflection. This has given rise to the capability of  
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constant renewal, the creation of  dynamic structures and–its most important 
and most individual feature–the separation of  the spiritual and the temporal 
(ultimately, of  church and state). Having settled in geographical Central Europe, 
the Hungarians initially put out feelers to Byzantium but eventually joined 
Latin Europe, the respublica Christiana. Ever since, Hungary has been part of  the 
constant renaissance that characterizes life in the West. Romanesque and Gothic 
art, humanism, Renaissance, Mannerism, Baroque, Rococo, Neo-Classicism, 
Romanticism, the avant-garde, etc. have without exception, if  sometimes with 
some delay or reduced intensity and prevalence, appeared and taken effect in 
Hungary. (Indeed, a more complete set of  styles appeared here than in Italy or 
France, for example.) The furthest reach of  the Gothic style clearly marks out 
the borders of  the European Occidens, and it coincides exactly with the eastern 
edges of  old Hungary.
Hungary thus became part of  Latin Europe, but has always remained at 
the outer frontiers. Its borders were the political and military boundaries of  the 
Occidens, beyond which Byzantine civilization stretched out to the east and south. 
Hungary earned widespread respect in repulsing the long series of  attacks by 
Eastern peoples from beyond the Carpathians and the southern river borders, 
and developed into one of  the largest and strongest states of  contemporary 
Europe. The Latin West regarded the Hungarian kings as “defenders of  
Christendom,” “champions of  Christ,” etc., and the country as the “gateway 
to the east.” Never forgetting their oriental roots, Hungary’s people and leaders 
always chose the West, whatever the price. This happened during the Mongol 
Invasion of  1241–1242 and the time of  Ottoman Turkish occupation, when the 
wars fought to defend the country and the West led to demographic and political 
catastrophe for Hungary.
There is of  course a line of  argument, especially in the historiography 
of  some Balkan countries, that denies Hungary’s Westernness. Even some 
Hungarian scholars, notably the internationally-renowned Jenő Szűcs, who 
divide Europe into three historical parts and place Hungary in “middle” Europe. 
But a brief  comparison of  the late medieval Hungarian and Balkan states, as has 
been made by Pál Engel, immediately demonstrates why Hungary should be 
regarded as part of  the West. 
The first difference is in the role of  the church. The adoption and development 
of  intellectual currents displayed by the Hungarian church were not paralleled 
in the Balkans. Hungarian bishops were ecclesiastical princes, with enormous 
estates and political functions, while in the Orthodox world, the bishops lived 
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in monasteries and were part of  the state rather than an independent body. 
Secondly, there were enormous differences in the secular institutions. Hungary 
was from the beginning a state entity (corpus) with a stable structure, while 
the Balkan states were territorially fluid. The Kingdom of  Hungary had well-
established state symbols: the Holy Crown symbolized continuity and strength 
of  the state body. The coronation developed with well-defined ritual and criteria, 
and the state had well-defined armorial bearings. Hungary’s statehood did not 
face danger even when there was a break in royal power. These features were all 
absent in the Balkans. Hungary’s stability largely rested on a system of  estates 
that provided hierarchical representation of  political groupings (universitates) 
headed by the king (caput), and together they passed the laws of  the land through 
the diets. This did not exist in the Balkans. Latin literacy, the other component of  
institutional stability, was much more advanced in Hungary than in the Balkans 
and left several times as much to posterity. Urban autonomy based on Roman 
law was established and–by European comparison–very widespread in Hungary. 
There were even a few true (royal) towns surrounded by villages. No such 
towns existed in the Balkans, castle and town were distinguished much later–by 
adoption of  the Hungarian word varoš (Rom. oraş). In medieval Hungary, the 
peasant had the legal status of  Hörige and enjoyed Freizügigkeit privileges, while in 
the Balkans, he was bonded and subject to corvee labor. 
This is perhaps enough to convey the deep correspondences of  structure 
and content that underpin Hungary’s classification as Western, in contrast with 
the Orthodox-Slavic world. This does not mean that Hungary reached the same 
stage of  development at all times or in every respect. The difference can most 
clearly be perceived in the Romanesque or Gothic churches in small Hungarian 
villages: they had the same structure as churches in French village churches, but 
in size and ornament, they look like reduced copies.
Paradoxically, it was during the period of  the dual monarchy, when Hungary 
was closest to Western Europe, that some of  its elite turned to the East. This 
was partly due to the influence of  European “orientalism,” but a crucial factor 
was the rediscovery of  the Hungarian people’s Eastern origins. Interest in the 
Eastern character took effect in developing the nation-building strategy in the 
second half  of  the nineteenth century. Two conceptions clashed in Hungary 
at that time. One was the “nation-state” concept, which regarded all of  the 
ethnic groups in Hungary, rather than just the Magyars, as part of  the Hungarian 
nation. This put the stress on citizenship in its definition of  the nation. The 
other was the “cultural nation” concept, which saw the nation as residing in 
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the community defined by shared ethnic origin and language. This placed great 
significance on folk culture, an area of  discovery at the time, which was seen as 
the imprint of  ancient–oriental–Hungarian culture. Another contributory theme 
was an attitude that had been gathering strength since the Ottoman invasion, 
the feeling of  “aloneness,” and the fear of  stronger Western nations (including 
the Austrians) and the increasingly assertive ideologies of  pan-Germanism and 
pan-Slavism. Feelings of  ethnic isolation prompted patriotic Hungarians to seek 
support and refuge in the East, to which they reached out with great enthusiasm 
and curiosity, identifying there the ancient forms of  the Hungarian character and 
soul. This accounts for the popularity, after the turn of  the twentieth century, 
of  “Turanist” and “pan-Turanist” ideas (which actually became most prominent 
in the Ottoman Empire). Turanism offered nations who felt threatened and 
friendless with the hope of  finding a place in a community or, more daringly, 
of  setting up a great Eurasian empire. The intensifying draw of  the East set 
off  a reaction among followers of  the Western orientation, and in the ensuing 
debate, the concepts of  East and West took on symbolic significance. Thus 
in 1905, the poet Endre Ady described Hungary as a ferry country that plies 
back and forth between the banks of  East and West. Politicians and intellectuals 
committed to the idea of  the nation-state stood by the Habsburg Monarchy and 
Western orientation, and historians refuted oriental romanticism with historical 
arguments. Gyula Szekfű, for example, a prominent historian in both the dualist 
and Horthy eras, described the conflicts in Hungary between the fifteenth and 
seventeenth centuries as the clash of  two civilizations, East and West, diverting 
the Hungarian nation and state from its main course of  development. The 
Hungarian government between the two world wars also revived the old idea 
of  the “bastion of  Christendom” with a view to bolstering the country’s role in 
defence against the Bolsheviks. It was an irony of  fate that after the Second World 
War, Hungary became the western bastion of  the communist world. Since then, 
heavyweight intellectuals have continued to ponder the question of  what makes 
Hungarians what they are. Do they belong to East or to West? Many people in 
the European Union, but also within Hungary, look on in bewilderment at the 
recent foreign policy of  “opening to the East,” with occasional but highly visible 
breaks from Western allies and their expectations. Also attracting international 
attention is the new oriental romanticism that has gained great popularity in some 
sections of  Hungarian society. It includes such ideas as neo-Turanism, which is 
usually–but perhaps erroneously–associated with extreme right-wing political 
groups. The experience of  a thousand years on the frontier and particularly 
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of  the Ottoman occupation have engendered reflexes that inevitably cause 
the Eastern orientation, like an underground stream, to spring to the surface 
from time to time, but it has never seriously challenged the country’s western 
alignment and commitment.
Having looked at Hungary’s general situation in Europe and the search for 
its true place, now let us look at the fundamental institutional and structural 
elements that have ensured continuity and stability among the constant changes 
of  Hungarian history.
The Building Blocks of  Continuity
The form of  state and system of  laws
In 1191, the English court chaplain Giraldus Cambrensis wrote a chronicle about 
a journey to Wales made by Archbishop Balduin some time previously. He wrote 
that the journey took place when Urban was pope, Frederick was the German 
emperor, Isaac was Byzantine emperor, Philip was king of  France, Henry was 
king of  England, Béla ruled in Hungary, and Saladin took Jerusalem. The list 
illustrates the respect enjoyed by the Hungarian state founded by Saint Stephen, 
a respect that seems astonishing from today’s perspective. In the Árpádian and 
Angevin ages, the Hungarian state wielded greater power in its own territory than 
Western states did in theirs. This power was based on a system of  castles, castle 
domains and royal counties that the king granted to his main followers (barones) 
as “official fiefs” (Amstlehen). The castle domain was a form of  administrative 
organization that afforded the kings almost absolute power, but it began to 
disintegrate in the second half  of  the fourteenth century, whereupon the nobles 
made determined progress towards feudal organization. The Hungarian state 
organization followed the opposite route to its Western counterparts: in France, 
for example, the king gradually built up control over the country between 
1200 and 1500 by extending the royal domaines and absorbing feudal estates, 
while in Hungary, the estates with political rights—the “country”—extended 
their influence over the state. The ideology for the changeover to feudal dualist 
government was drawn from the doctrine of  the Holy Crown. This was one 
of  the earliest and longest-lived symbolic conception of  state in Europe (and 
in many respects survives in the present), expressing rule abstracted from royal 
power, a kingdom that transcends dynasties, and territorial unity. After the 
middle of  the fifteenth century, the crown of  St Stephen was not the possession 
of  the king but the “holy crown of  the country.” A king could be legitimate only 
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if  invested with this crown by the consent of  the inhabitants of  the country (the 
estates). Hungary thus became an elective monarchy and developed a two-pole 
legal and political system based on cooperation between the king and the estates, 
the court and the noble diet. It survived as such right up to 1918. The principles 
underlying the system were laid down by István Werbőczy in his famous 
Tripartitum opus in 1514, the “original Hungarian constitution,” defining the legal 
equality of  magnates and lower nobility and of  the ecclesiastical and secular 
estates, and the fundamental rights of  the nobility. Werbőczy thereby took a 
great strides towards widening the political base, a development regarded as 
one of  the principal ingredients of  early modernity. He was similarly innovative 
in laying down the right of  primogeniture, which in some Western states was 
introduced only in the nineteenth century as a demand of  bourgeois democracy 
(and a device for breaking the aristocracy). Werbőczy set off  progress towards 
legality, constitutionality and national sovereignty by underlining the need for 
cooperation between the king and the (noble) nation in exercising the power of  
making laws. The established and still-dominant historiographical assessment, 
however, does not properly appreciate the true value and novelty of  this 
achievement and tends to regard Werbőczy as the symbol and indeed the main 
cause of  immovability and backwardness. For the historians of  Central and 
Eastern Europe, the strong and sometimes coercive “absolutist state” became 
the standard, the model, even though only a few early modern states met the–
subsequently-formulated–criteria. It is not inconceivable that the Hungarian and 
Polish road to state-building might have led to a completely different Central 
Europe if  the Ottoman occupation had not constantly diverted the course of  
political and social change in Hungary.
Having emerged and consolidated in the period between the fifteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the system became increasingly ossified under the 
influence of  Ottoman occupation and the constraints imposed by Habsburg rule 
(of  which more later), and by the end of  the nineteenth century, it was failing to 
meet the demands of  the age. The next step, which was to extend noble rights 
to the whole of  society, took place later and less completely than elsewhere in 
Europe. The forms of  modern constitutionality–a system of  representation, 
parliamentarianism and legal accountability of  government–were put in place in 
1848 and 1867, but the crown retained some of  its autocratic rights, mainly in 
military and foreign affairs. The Hungarian parliament worked more or less as it 
had in the early modern age: the diets remained the forum for negotiations with 
the king (dietalis tractatus). No parliamentary system of  government emerged, 
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the majority principle was not applied, and the monarch remained on equal 
rank in the legislature. He decided who to appoint to the head of  government 
and who should be in the cabinet. Whereas in the West, the principle of  legal 
presumption (die rechtliche Vermuthung/praesumptio iuris) favoured the individual 
(where the law did not prescribe, the citizen was free), in Hungary, the rule 
of  law (Rechtsstaat) was only partly implemented. Legal presumption stemmed 
from the right of  the state rather than of  the individual, and parliament did not 
fully provide for the rights of  citizens. Instead, the representatives and organs 
of  state power (minister, county, etc.) prescribed the rights of  individuals and 
social groups by discretionary decrees. The citizen–to quote Montesquieu–
could be forced into something that was “not compelled by law,” and prohibited 
from doing something “that the law permitted.” László Péter put it like this: 
in Hungary, the constitution was free but the individual was not. Not even the 
post–First World War collapse and revolutions brought meaningful change, even 
though the loss of  the throne deprived the Hungarian constitution of  much 
of  its function. The communist regime that took power after 1945 destroyed 
whatever progress there had been to the division of  power and established 
an Eastern European-type despotic state. Following their reorganization after 
1990, Hungarian state institutions now comply with the requirements of  the 
rule of  law in every respect. But the thousand-year traditions and reflexes did 
not, and could not, disappear from one day to the next. A strong, effective 
state is regarded in some political circles and broad sections of  society to be 
the main guarantee of  national sovereignty, self-determination and social peace. 
Accordingly, Hungarian citizens often tend to look to the state to solve a large 
part of  their problems, which explains the broad public support for the exercise 
of  power in a way that looks authoritarian to outsiders. Another question is 
why Hungary is customarily judged more harshly for such phenomena than 
the average European country. A good example is the Horthy era, of  which 
a very dark picture emerged and persists in both Hungarian and international 
historiography and memory politics. Recent analyses by historians and political 
scientists by comparison with other European political systems of  the time have 
resulted in a picture that is far from being positive, though much more nuanced.
The multiethnic state: peoples and nations in Hungary
Until it fell in 1918, the old Hungary was always an “empire” of  many elements, 
inhabited by many ethnic groups. The original conquerors were themselves of  
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mixed origin, and the country constantly received immigrants from the beginning 
of  the rule of  the Árpád dynasty onwards. The first groups to arrive from the east 
were the Jews, the Khwarezmians and the Pechenegs, followed in the thirteenth 
century by the Cumans, the Jazygians and the Romanians (Vlachs). From the 
west, successive waves of  German, Wallonian and Italian hospites were settled 
on royal estates. The Western settlers were by “right of  hospitality” allowed 
to retain their customs in their chosen land. The hospites brought much to the 
country: the Walloons, for example, laid the foundation for what was to become 
the world famous grapes and wine of  Tokaj, and the Saxons of  Transylvania and 
Upper Hungary (today Spiš, Slovakia) played a defining role in the establishment 
of  towns in Hungary and the adoption of  Western urban and ethnic-regional 
autonomies.
Just when the ethnic Hungarian population of  this multiethnic country was 
undergoing an ethnic expansion in the fifteenth century, the Ottoman conquerors 
appeared at the borders and, soon afterwards, in the interior. The devastation 
and population shifts caused by military actions, together with the Ottoman 
regime established in the heart of  Hungary, caused fundamental changes in 
ethnic distribution. As ethnic Hungarians thinned out where the wars were 
fought, their place was taken by Serbs moving in from the south, Romanians 
from the east and Slovaks from the north. In the seventeenth century, large 
numbers of  people of  another Balkan ethnic group, the Armenians, arrived in 
Hungary via Transylvania. A mass of  German settlers brought in to make up 
for the reduced population further colored the ethnic map of  the country in the 
eighteenth century.
Despite this, we rarely find any examples of  ethnic clashes in Hungary 
before the eighteenth century. It was natural to identify with more than one 
ethnic group (a fine example being the Zrínyi family), and in areas populated by 
ethnic groups, the lord would normally speak with his peasants in their mother 
tongue. The section of  society that held political rights, the “noble nation” (natio 
hungarica), imbued nearly every other social and ethnic group with their own 
worldview and understanding of  history, and until the formation of  nations, the 
great majority of  the country’s inhabitants regarded themselves as hungarus, loyal 
subjects of  the kingdom, without feeling any contradiction with their own ethnic 
identity. Speaking Hungarian was not a condition of  belonging to the noble 
nation. There were substantial groups of  Romanian and Slovakian nobility who 
proudly declared themselves part of  the Hungarian nation, which they conceived 
as a community of  origin and values. An illustrative example is the family of  
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the firebrand leader of  the 1848 Hungarian Revolution, Lajos Kossuth. The 
mother tongue of  his forebears was Slovak, although Hungarian was the spoken 
language in his family. His father László Kossuth chose a German-born wife, 
which is probably why they kept their Lutheran religion even as the speaking of  
Slovakian passed out of  the family. His uncle, György Kossuth, possessed both 
Hungarian noble (hungarus) and Slovak national identity, and gave real support to 
one branch of  the Slovak national movement. According to Domokos Kosáry, 
who quotes Slovak historians, György Kossuth “as a defender of  noble privileges 
was angry at his nephew, saying that it would have been better, if  he had drowned 
in the garden pond when he spent his childhood summers with them.”1 Until 
the modern national ideal began to gain ground (and partly afterwards, as the 
example of  the Kossuth family shows), the Hungarian nobility was an institution 
capable of  providing cohesion in a heterogeneous country. This was neatly 
expressed by the great Hungarian writer Kálmán Mikszáth at the turn of  the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries: “Because the Hungarian nobility was a wise 
political institution in its time. It was the blood-collecting basin. If  somebody 
earned respect in any area, he piled up some kind of  assets, either intellectual or 
material, that represented strength, be he Vlach or German, he was taken into the 
fort right away, for if  there’s strength, let it be inside. That’s why this nation has 
survived so long. Because an outsider who could have done something against 
it was let in among them. The weak and the impotent stayed outside. Wise men 
were our forebears, you must give them that. […] The Hungarian nobility was 
not a sheer, cold wall that kept the privileged class from the people. It had a 
gate, with a great wide arch, so that all that was of  merit would get through 
it.”2 Even in the nineteenth century, the Hungarian world had an unbelievable 
power of  attraction and assimilation. The world-renowned writer Sándor Márai, 
whose ancestors came to Hungary in the time of  Maria Theresia, had this to say: 
“These inspectors, counsellors, prefects, treasury domain and mine managers 
still corresponded in Hungarian at the beginning of  last century (when noble 
Hungarian families, especially the magnates, still preferred to write in German 
or Latin!), this immigrant clan spoke and felt Hungarian; all the more astonishing 
1 Domokos Kosáry, Kossuth Lajos a reformkorban [Lajos Kossuth in the age of  reform], (Budapest: Osiris, 
2002), 27.
2 Kálmán Mikszáth, “Horváth uram három leánya” [Mr Horváth’s three daughters], in Mikszáth Kálmán 
összes művei. 43. kötet. Elbeszélések XVII. 1898–1903 [Complete works of  Kálmán Mikszáth, vol 43. Short 
stories 17, 1898–1903], edited by Mihály Szegedy-Maszák and Anna Fábri (Budapest, 2015), 203.
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because the family owed all of  its privileges and positions to the emperor, and it 
was just a hundred years earlier that they left Saxony!”3
This hungarus world gradually crumbled in the nineteenth century. The 
changeover from multiethnic empires to multinational empires invalidated one 
of  the basic doctrines of  Hungarian political thinking: that only the Hungarians 
had the strength and ability to take the political lead in the Carpathian Basin. 
Elites that were maturing their ethnic groups’ national awareness into political 
movements were not aiming for acculturation or assimilation. They wanted their 
own political entities. The eastern half  of  the Habsburg Empire, structured on 
Hungarian political traditions and political culture, inhibited the growth of  their 
cultural and economic strength and their political influence and social prestige. 
Their activity contributed to the decline of  the dual monarchy. The disintegration 
of  the Habsburg Monarchy tore apart an institutional framework that had 
ripened through centuries of  coexistence among peoples of  diverse ethnicity, 
religion and language. The new state system that emerged after 1918, despite the 
rhetoric of  national self-determination, was unable to establish better or more 
durable structures for the coexistence of  peoples in the Carpathian Basin.
Religions and churches in Hungary
The medieval and early modern Kingdom of  Hungary had unparalleled religious 
as well as ethnic diversity. During the rule of  the Árpád dynasty, besides the 
Latin Christian majority and the Orthodox Christian minority, there were several 
non-Christian groups in the country: Jews, Muslims and “pagans.” These came 
in voluntarily, and continuously, between the tenth and twelfth centuries, finding 
a place they could live and practise their religions with a freedom that was 
unknown elsewhere. The Jews served the ruling house as merchants and men 
of  finance; some Muslims had similar functions and others served as soldiers. 
In exchange, they enjoyed royal protection against the clergy and the Christian 
Church in Hungary. Around 1150, King Géza even allowed Muslims to practise 
polygamy and keep concubines. There is a record from around 1220 that Muslim 
students from Hungary visited the schools of  Aleppo in Syria. These groups had 
assimilated by natural processes by the end of  the thirteenth century. Relations 
between Latin and Orthodox Christians were similarly harmonious. Everyone 
was aware of, and accepted, the differences in ritual and language, and landlords 
3 Sándor Márai, Egy polgár vallomásai [Confessions of  a citizen] (Budapest, 2000), 36.
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chose priests for the churches under their patronage according to the faith of  
the local inhabitants. Before the Reformation, religion and language were not a 
matter of  power, and no conflicts arose from the dissimilarities.
Although the Reformation started up a completely new era, the Hungarian 
Reformation resulted in a multi-confessional model that has no parallels 
outside the Carpathian Basin. The Habsburg-ruled Kingdom of  Hungary, 
the Ottoman-vassal Principality of  Transylvania, and the Ottoman-controlled 
central part of  Hungary accommodated four different confessions, each with 
its own organization and a large number of  adherents. The Catholic Church 
survived in all three areas, in differing forms and under different conditions. 
Alongside it, church organizations were established for the Lutheran, Reformed 
(Calvinist) and–except in the Kingdom–Unitarian faiths. These forged a peculiar 
state of  balance, and by European comparison lived together in relative peace, 
if  under varying legal and institutional constraints. There was never a religious 
war in Hungary and the very rare violent incidents mainly broke out between 
Protestant confessions. In Transylvania, the Torda Diet of  1568 was the first in 
Europe to proclaim the freedom of  worship for Catholic, Reformed, Lutheran 
and Unitarian confessions and grant free choice of  priests. The Transylvanian 
Diet of  1594 was the first to recognize the four churches as “accepted” (recepta) 
confessions. Such a sustained multiconfessional system, safeguarded by legal 
and institutional guarantees, did not exist in any other country of  Europe. That 
was because the Transylvanian state was established just at the time that the 
confessions were forming up, so that as the prince was consolidating his power, 
he inherited more or less established churches on which he could perhaps impose 
constraints, but he could not destroy them. The Kingdom of  Hungary was a 
frontier state entity in a complex monarchy that had Catholicism as its state 
religion. The ruler was obliged to give concessions to his Lutheran and Calvinist 
subjects, mainly to ensure the operation of  the defensive system against the 
Ottomans and the voluntary recognition of  Habsburg rule. In Ottoman Hungary, 
a community’s choice of  confession was of  interest to the occupiers only to the 
extent that it affected their consolidation efforts and economic interests. The 
Hungarian Reformation, and in the wider sense the formation of  confessions in 
the country, may be described as a curiosity of  world history. Hungarian society 
learned about the ideals of  European Reformation, but the frontier situation and 
the unique division of  political control caused it to adopt this raw material very 
creatively and produce something qualitatively new, by permanently instituting 
and never abolishing multiconfessionality within the state. This caused a great 
HHR_2020-1_KÖNYV.indb   125 7/28/2020   9:10:54 AM
126
Hungarian Historical Review 9,  no. 1  (2020): 113–139
many direct influences to be incorporated into Hungarian culture. Although 
the same multiconfessionality undoubtedly weakened national solidarity for 
centuries and intolerance remained, coexistence of  dissimilar religious groups 
at least nurtured the capability to cooperate and–by encouraging a receptive and 
above all reflective attitude–to perceive things in a more nuanced way.
In the period between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
contradictions that beset the relationship between state and society in general 
also showed up in religious and church affairs. The monarch had broad powers 
in religious affairs, and the Catholic Church was closely bound to the crown 
through the right of  patronage (ius patronatus). Protestant communities were self-
governing but subject to supervision by the crown, and the same was true for the 
Orthodox Church. Protestants in Hungary were popularly associated with the 
national cause and Catholics were associated with Habsburg interests. Churches 
did not achieve equal status, and the hierarchical system of  privileges that resulted 
from a combination of  common law, royal decrees, ministerial instructions and 
legislation strengthened rather than relaxed the grip of  the state. Consequently, 
by the end of  the nineteenth century, confessions in Hungary were tacitly divided 
into the categories of  “accepted,” “recognized” and “tolerated.” The “accepted” 
religions basically comprised the Catholic and Orthodox churches and the three 
Protestant denominations. The “recognized” religions were Judaism (1867), the 
Baptist denomination (1905) and, unusually for a European country, indeed 
only the second time on the continent, Islam (1916). The Jewish religion was 
“promoted” to an accepted religion in 1895, but “demoted” to “recognized” in 
1942. Finally, the “tolerated” religions comprised “sects” such as the Nazarenes, 
which the authorities viewed with suspicion and issued decrees that attempted 
to shift them towards legality. This system put the churches at the mercy of  the 
secular authorities, which played them off  against each other and prompted 
them to develop ways of  playing the system rather than a critical attitude. The 
churches therefore adapted to social changes with difficulty, if  at all. State control 
engendered dependence and a false sense of  security, for which the churches 
paid a double price after 1945. It also explains why the churches in Hungary 
put up less resistance than might have been expected to the ruthless anti-church 
and anti-religious policies of  the communist authorities. After 1990, the pre-
1945 condition returned to some extent, although this was partly because the 
churches had lost their financial base and needed state assistance to perform 
their social role.
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Now we have seen the structures and institutions that underpinned stability 
and continuity, let us look at the forces that have challenged or broken Hungary’s 
links to the West since the early modern age. The first and most important of  
these was Ottoman expansion.
Fault Lines and Interruptions
Ottoman occupation: three countries, one homeland
Hungary suffered its first Ottoman attack in 1390, after which war raged in some 
corner of  its territory almost without pause until the Peace of  Passarowitz in 
1718. Hungarian resistance was broken at the battle of  Mohács in 1526, and the 
country suddenly found itself  the frontier territory of  two great powers. In the 
ensuing stalemate, they divided Hungary between them. The Habsburg monarch 
ruled as king of  Hungary in the north and west, the Ottoman state in the center, 
and the eastern regions became a Hungarian-ruled Ottoman vassal state, the 
Principality of  Transylvania. This shifted the border between East and West 
to the heart of  Hungary, and the system of  defensive forts that kept the two 
powers apart cut right through the middle of  the ethnic Hungarian population. 
Nearly every part of  the country became a battleground. Incessant fighting and 
the militarized way of  life destroyed much of  the built environment, tore apart 
the structure of  settlement, caused the decline of  most urban centers, shifted 
the centers of  economic activity, and resulted in the loss of  between seventy and 
ninety per cent of  the population in some regions, mainly in the south. The losses 
were mainly to the Hungarian population, allowing gains by the ethnic groups 
living in border areas. These losses reduced the proportion of  Hungarians in 
the multiethnic country from seventy-five or eighty per cent to under fifty per 
cent by the end of  Ottoman rule. It is not without reason that many see the 
division of  Hungary after the First World War as being rooted in these changes. 
There were similar losses to the Hungarians religious and cultural centers and 
their institutions. Enormous numbers of  noble manors and monasteries were 
destroyed in lands under Ottoman and Hungarian control, and many parishes 
also disappeared.
One positive phenomenon was the resilience to the political divisions 
displayed by the Carpathian Basin economy. In the late sixteenth century, 
Hungary was the greatest exporter of  meat in the world. By the time these 
exports reached their peak, however, Western demographic expansion had 
stopped, leading to over-supply and falls in price. Farmers had a reliable market 
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for their grain among the soldiers stationed in the country. The agricultural boom 
conserved the product structure, however, slowing the growth of  manufacturing. 
The guild system persisted for a long time. The break-up of  the country did not 
destroy the unity of  the market in Hungary, and trade widened the horizons 
of  the peasantry and the newly-forming rural middle classes. The openness 
resulting from trade helped the spread of  Protestantism, which as we have seen 
took place peacefully even amongst the many theological disputes. Overall, the 
economic, linguistic and intellectual-religious links maintained a sense of  unity 
in the divided country. The Hungarians, as was later observed, lived in three 
countries but a single homeland.
There were further items on the debit side, however. The ascent of  the 
Habsburgs to the throne of  Hungary, despite its long-term dividends, caused 
the royal court to move out of  the country, a severe break that could only partly 
be made up for later. This denied the Hungarian people a center of  organization 
of  the kind that provided other Western countries a framework for the modern 
nation-state in the early modern and modern ages, homogenizing the people and 
the language and providing cultural patronage. To make just one comparison: in 
France, the use of  French, the language of  the court, was made obligatory in 
state administration in 1539, whereas in Hungary, Hungarian became the official 
language only in 1844. 
The other loss was intellectual, and to understand it is to gain an insight into 
the Hungarian mind. The Ottoman conquest ruined the political and cultural 
self-confidence of  the Hungarian elite. The religious and political leaders and the 
thinkers of  the time were gripped by a mixture of  guilt and self-accusation. They 
could not work out how a country that had been the “star of  Europe” could 
have sunk to being the plaything of  other countries. They could not forgive 
themselves for having frittered away an “empire.” This is the root of  a persistent 
current in the Hungarian search for identity and political thinking: the tradition 
of  denying responsibility and seeking scapegoats. According to Gáspár Károli, 
the author of  the first full Hungarian Bible translation, the catastrophe was 
the result of  the Hungarians’ general sins, while according to the chronicle of  
peasant-born György Szerémi, it was the fault of  infighting among the “lords.” 
According to a Lutheran preacher of  Sárvár, the followers of  the “stained papist 
faith” were the main perpetrators, while the leading Hungarian figure of  the 
Counter-Reformation, Péter Pázmány, saw the hand of  God in punishing the 
people for the Reformation.
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Given all this, we can say that the collapse of  the medieval Kingdom of  
Hungary was the severest break in the history of  the Hungarian state and 
people. It was a fault line that can be compared only to the collapse following 
the First World War. Gyula Szekfű may be understood for stating that “This 
Ottoman rule was the greatest, and perhaps the only, catastrophe in Hungarian 
history.”4 The next great challenge in the second five hundred years of  national 
and state existence was thus to defend the interests of  Hungarian society and a 
state that had been forced to give up some of  its independence, and to develop 
a relationship with the defining dynasty of  the region, the Habsburgs.
Constraints and opportunities in the Habsburg Empire
The Hungarian national consciousness and collective memory harbor highly 
contradictory, or simply negative, views of  the Habsburg dynasty. In the 
dominant “kuruc” historical approach traditionally ascribed to the Calvinists, one 
basic doctrine is that the Habsburg acquisition of  the crown was at least as big 
a blow to the Hungarians as the Mongol Invasion or Ottoman or Soviet rule. 
In this view, the Hungarian state lost is independence in 1526 and regained it in 
mutilated form between 1918 and 1920; the medieval Hungarian state continued 
in the Principality of  Transylvania, which also became the home of  Hungarian-
speaking culture, and the anti-Habsburg uprisings of  the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, mostly led by Transylvanian princes, were fights for liberty, 
national independence, and survival.
Over recent decades, Hungarian historiography has fundamentally revised 
the account that emerged during the National Romantic era. The new narrative 
describes Habsburg-Hungarian relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries as a successful compromise deriving from the interdependence of  
the dynasty and the Hungarian estates, and the uprisings to be enterprises that 
corrected occasional disturbances to the sensitive political and religious balance. 
Relations are therefore much better characterized by the series of  successful 
compromises between 1606 and 1867. The “empire of  St Stephen” did not 
come to an end in 1526. On the contrary, it remained a separate body within 
the Habsburg Empire, its prestige indicated by its place in political symbolism–
second after the Holy Roman Empire.
4  Gyula Szekfű, Magyar történet: A tizenhetedik század [The seventeenth century], in Bálint Hóman, Gyula 
Szekfű, Magyar történet [Hungarian history], (Budapest, n.d.), vol. 5, 108. 
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The Hungarian political elite, although they basically accepted–or were 
forced to cooperate with–the system, were constantly seeking an arrangement 
that was more beneficial to themselves. The great dilemma of  Hungarian politics 
and political thinking in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was whether 
to aim for a separate Hungarian state or to further national interests within 
the Habsburg Empire, and it is still a subject of  dispute in modern Hungarian 
historiography. Although Habsburg economic policy in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries is widely held to have been adverse for Hungary, 
Hungarian historians of  the period produce more and more arguments that 
the imperial framework provided the best conditions for the development of  
modern Hungary. Géza Pálffy, for example, gives this assessment of  the 1711 
“compromise”: “From being a decaying frontier land between two world powers 
for two hundred years, the Kingdom of  Hungary once again became a prominent 
country in Central Europe, operating within the framework of  the monarchy… 
In spring 1711, [after the failure of  Francis Rákóczi’s war of  independence] […] 
decline finally gave way to the long-awaited renewal.”5 The truth of  this is not 
diminished by the fact that the territorial integrity of  the pre-Mohács country 
was restored only in 1867, when Transylvania was once more made part of  
Hungary.
Homeland and Progress
From the turn of  the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Ottomans 
were expelled and the state of  Hungary was integrated into the Habsburg Empire, 
right up to the end of  the Second World War, or in another sense, until the 
last Soviet soldier left the Hungarian territory in 1991, Hungarian politics were 
dominated by the conflicting interpretations of  Hungarian national interest. Put 
most simply, the national issue boiled down to four principle sources of  conflict:
Hungary’s place in the Habsburg Empire;
Hungary and the great powers;
Hungarians and non-Hungarians in the Habsburg Empire, and after 1918,
Hungarian minorities in the successor states of  the Habsburg Monarchy;
The tension between liberalism and nationalism.
5  Géza Pálffy, Magyarország két világbirodalom határán, 1526–1711 [Hungary on the border between two 
world empires], in Magyarország története [History of  Hungary], edited by Ignác Romsics (Budapest, 2010), 
486.
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Four years are of  key significance to all of  these sources of  conflict: 1848, 
1867, 1918 and 1945.
Two phenomena brought the conflicts to come to a head in the revolutionary 
year of  1848: the Croatian, Serbian, Romanian and Slovakian national 
movements, and the recovering strength of  the counterrevolutionary political 
forces in Vienna. The confrontation reached its peak with the dethronement 
of  the Habsburgs on April 14, 1849: the form of  state was left open, but Lajos 
Kossuth was elected governor.
In the new international situation following the suppression of  the 
Revolution and War of  Independence in 1849, a period marked by Habsburg 
reprisals, the lower nobility, who had formed the basis of  the age of  reform and 
the Revolution, were deprived of  their economic, social and political strength. 
The Habsburgs’ modernization measures (such as the implementation of  the 
emancipation of  the serfs, which had been decided by the revolutionary parliament, 
and the dissolution of  the guild system) was held by many contemporaries, and 
not without reason, to be aimed at breaking “the backbone of  the nation” and 
engendered very strong–but largely passive–resistance. 
Until 1867, political activity in pursuit of  national objectives was closely 
linked to modernization objectives. In the period of  dualism, however, the two 
objectives often came into conflict. In his description of  dualist-era Hungarian 
society, Péter Hanák often uses the expression “dual structure.” This refers to 
two Hungarian social hierarchies that existed side by side during these years: the 
traditional feudal hierarchy with its high prestige, and the bourgeois hierarchy 
with its burgeoning economic strength. This prevented the emergence of  
a coherent national middle class, a necessary pillar of  modern society. Often 
regarded by the public as alien and un-Hungarian, the attempts at bourgeois 
reform often came into conflict with political currents that regarded themselves 
as representing the interests of  the nation. These parties and movements wanted 
to protect the traditional feudal structures and thereby opposed attempts at 
modernization, which involved largely assimilated sections of  society. This had 
serious consequences: very few major figures in Hungarian cultural and political 
life succeeded in reconciling modernization plans with national aspirations, 
and even they usually got no further than theorizing and planning. The central 
focus of  political life was to promote Hungarian national sovereignty against the 
Hapsburgs and the domestic national minorities. Those who criticized this view 
for any reason were often accused of  “betraying” the interests of  the nation. 
This was experienced by anybody who was positive about elements of  Habsburg 
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policy or who proposed moderation in the assimilation policy towards ethnic 
minorities.
The Compromise of  1867 was the overture to a period of  real consolidation 
in Hungarian history, one that brought prosperity to most sections of  society. By 
the turn of  the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, Hungarian national 
liberalism was no longer the driving force of  social and economic modernization 
but increasingly an ossified ideology stubbornly defending the old political and 
social structures.
Continuities and Discontinuities in the Twentieth Century
The tension between continuities and discontinuities, our main theme here, is 
best studied through events of  the twentieth century, and so we will approach it 
through the debates in the politics of  history and memory following the political 
transition.
For a nation that experienced, during the twentieth century, nine changes 
of  system, six forms of  state, four border revisions, three revolutions and two 
world wars, and whose country was invaded three times, history is not some 
abstract academic discourse but a matter of  direct public experience that 
politicians must take into account if  they want to succeed. In Hungary’s political 
transition, positions taken on historical themes made definitive contributions to 
the formation of  political parties and their programs, and to the elucidation of  
differences between political groups and schools of  thought.
Trianon
There is general agreement among politicians of  the most diverse ideological 
stance and historians of  all kinds of  theoretical and methodological approaches 
that the decisive event in the twentieth-century history of  Hungary was the 
signing of  the Trianon Peace Treaty on June 4, 1920. The Treaty of  Trianon 
forced Hungary to renounce two-thirds of  its pre-war territory (its area 
decreasing from 282,000 to 93,000 square kilometers, not counting Croatia) 
and one third of  the Hungarian-speaking population, 3,327,000 people, in 
favor of  other successor states of  the Habsburg Empire. (The population of  
the country was reduced from 18.2 to 7.6 million). The imposed treaty, which 
largely ascribed to Hungary the responsibility for starting the war, destroyed the 
“empire” of  Saint Stephen. Hungary’s economic and trading system collapsed, 
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and it was even forced to pay reparations. In the 1920s, Hungary had to rebuild 
its state and its economy from almost nothing. The Hungarian minorities were 
not given the promised rights of  self-determination in any of  the successor 
states. The imposed treaty inevitably engendered revisionist aspirations, leading 
the countries leaders to a serious of  bad decisions in the second half  of  the 
1930s. The communist regime established after the Second World War made 
the trauma of  Trianon a taboo subject, and it was only mentioned in attempts 
to make the Hungarians agree with the victors. Following the political transition, 
the suppressed feelings of  national grievance erupted with elemental force. 
Since 1990, this national tragedy has been regarded in many circles as the source 
of  all of  the country’s subsequent social and economic tragedies, and attribution 
of  responsibility for the loss of  a country that was built up through many 
centuries of  effort has been treated as a key historical and political question. 
Attempts to find the culprit, however, have tended to underestimate the extent 
of  the Hungarians’ own responsibility for the catastrophe. There are also some 
loud if  not dominant voices in public life who continue the pre-1990 rhetoric, 
and offend many Hungarians by contending that the Trianon punishment was 
deserved, and unworthy of  discussion. Mainstream political thinking, however, 
is in agreement with the most recent scholarly analysis by Ignác Romsics, which 
concludes that the Treaty of  Trianon, and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty that 
replaced it, were unjust to the Hungarians. Hungarians are indisputably justified 
in demanding rights of  self-determination for their minority communities in 
neighboring countries. To hope for any more is surely an illusion, and to demand 
any more would be ill-considered.
Voluntary or forced? Hungary in the Second World War
The assessment of  Hungary’s political system between 1919 and 1945 and the 
part it played in the Second World War have been among the most prominent 
historical themes in the political discourse since the political transition of  1989–
90. The Horthy era has also generated questions of  continuity and discontinuity. 
Miklós Horthy, “regent” and head of  state between 1920 and 1944, is one of  
the most controversial figures of  modern Hungarian history. For those on the 
right wing, Horthy’s system, despite the lack of  democracy, was much more 
legitimate than the communism imposed on Hungary from outside and may 
stand as an antecedent of  the democratic system created in 1990. Those on 
left wing regard Horthy and his regime as a dead end and do not want any 
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continuity with it, particularly because of  the responsibility it is said to bear for 
the killing of  the majority of  Hungarian Jews. They prefer to look on the short 
“democratic” period between 1945 and 1948 and 1956 as the direct antecedents 
of  today’s democracy, although some recent research challenges this assessment 
concerning the 1945–1948 period.
The most oversimplified, schematic assessments started to be reviewed by 
Hungarian historians in the 1980s. They assessed the nationalism and irredentism 
of  the Horthy era in comparison with similar phenomena in other small states in 
the region. Leading historians have given accounts of  the authoritarian political 
system and the broad powers of  the regent not as steps towards totalitarianism 
but as a show of  strength against political movements that were infused with 
extreme right-wing, Fascist and Nazi influences. Few, however, dispute that in 
pursuing his revisionist aims, the close ties Horthy forged with Germany were 
not in Hungary’s long-term interests. 
The Rákosi system and the 1956 Revolution 
In 1944, it was agreed that Hungary would be taken as booty by the victorious 
Soviet empire. For the first time in its history, the country would belong not 
to the West but to an autocratic Eastern European civilization. Within a few 
years, exiled communists returning from the Soviet Union in 1945 ruthlessly 
built up a Stalinist dictatorship under the leadership of  Mátyás Rákosi, “Stalin’s 
best pupil.” This process can best be summed up as a war waged by the state 
against its own citizens masked by an illusion of  rapid, all-encompassing 
modernization. Deprived of  its economic independence and personal freedoms, 
nearly every section of  Hungarian society was kept under permanent police 
terror. Everything was pervaded by centrally-controlled messianic communist 
ideology, one aspect of  which was a total reinterpretation of  the past. The new 
view of  history involved a fixation on Hungary’s belonging to Eastern Europe 
and an interpretation of  the previous four hundred years as nothing more than 
the story of  independence struggles against the Ottomans, Habsburgs and the 
Germans.
On October 23, 1956, the people of  Hungary rose up in rare unanimity 
against the oppressive system. As the leading Western powers remained passive, 
the Soviet Union brutally suppressed the movement on November 4. The 
assessment of  the event and what led up to it are still subjects of  controversy in 
Hungary and abroad. We certainly regard it as a turning point in world history, 
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because in the long term it made an irretrievable breach in the wall of  the 
communist world system. In addition to being a reaction against oppression, 
it was a moral act: a fight to protect human dignity. 1956 was also a fight for 
Hungary’s internal and external self-determination, and Hungarians are still 
very sensitive to what they see as attempts to restrict the independence that was 
recovered with such a struggle. Consequently, we do not agree with the views 
that 1956 was an “uprising,” “rebellion” or “counter-revolution.” We take the 
side of  those who see the Hungarian people as effecting a “revolution” and a 
“fight for freedom” in 1956, because–as observed by Norman Davies–they did 
indeed want to overthrow a system of  government together with its social and 
cultural foundations. For Hungarians, the real tragedy of  1956 is not just defeat 
by the Soviet Union but the still-unrepaired damage done by the Kádár system 
that was then put in place. It is a great pity that commemoration of  1956 has 
become divisive over the last thirty years. In summer and autumn 1989, it was the 
common foundation that prompted action by highly diverse political currents 
critical of  the communist regime. However, since the early 1990s, interpretations 
of  the causes, course and consequences of  the 1956 revolution and struggle for 
freedom have been frequently exploited for political goals to suit the needs of  
constructing historical legitimacy.
The Kádár system
Although the Kádár system is looked on by many Hungarians as different from 
the Rákosi system it replaced, the two systems shared the same theoretical 
principles, long-term objectives and system of  government. Their tactics, 
however, were very different: what his predecessors effected by force and open 
terror, Kádár, after the initial bloody reprisals, did by bribery and gradually 
wearing down the real opponents. Over a period of  thirty years, the “Goulash 
Communism” system, which built up living conditions on shaky foundations, 
guided the traditionally highly nationally-minded Hungarian society towards 
the acceptance of  pragmatic survival strategies and broke up the Hungarian 
middle class and rural society (by the enforced introduction of  the cooperative 
system). Hungarian society has still not shaken off  the consequences of  this. His 
apparent liberalism, so unusual in the communist world, made Kádár a favourite 
in the West, but was much criticized within the Soviet Bloc.
An assessment of  the continuities and discontinuities of  the Kádár system 
(1956–1988) is an essential part of  the search for the antecedents of  post-
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communist democratic political systems. The academic and political-social 
debate on the Kádár era centers around two politically-motivated areas. One 
involves the social base of  the state party: prior to the transition, about twenty 
per cent of  the active working population of  Hungary were members of  the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP). The question is: does this large 
number reflect coercion and fear of  reprisals, the number of  “real” communists 
being no more than 30,000 (the number of  members of  the Hungarian 
Communist Party in spring 1945 and of  the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
at the end of  1956; the successor to the MSZMP, the Hungarian Socialist Party 
and the Workers’ Party had a similar combined number of  members at the end 
of  1989) or–at least during the period of  stabilization of  the system (from about 
1962 to 1980)–not only the steadily-expanding party membership but also a 
large part of  Hungarian society, even if  they did not necessarily support it, did 
not actively oppose the objectives and political methods of  the Kádár system. 
The other question concerns the decline and fall of  the system, the “hierarchy” 
of  the four main causes: 1. The fundamental rearrangement of  the international 
political and economic environment. 2. The structural faults and deficiencies in 
the pillars of  the socialist-communist system. 3. The activity of  the opposition, 
the various groups of  dissenters. 4. The work of  reform communists within 
the party. Which factor contributed to what extent in the demolition of  the 
monolithic party state? There is not yet a consensus on the answer.
The Power of  Continuity and Tradition
Returning again to the main theme of  our talk, the continuities and discontinuities 
in Hungarian history, we present as a closing example the first political debate 
following the political transition that affected fundamental questions of  our 
history.
When parliament became the real center of  Hungarian politics after the 
first free elections for four decades, it had to deal with questions of  historical 
legitimacy. Some members of  our profession who had been elected to parliament 
or appointed to important political posts made a considerable contribution to 
this debate. One of  the first items on the agenda of  the new parliament was a 
decision on a new coat of  arms for the state. This prompted a clash of  widely 
varying viewpoints. Several historians favored the coat of  arms without the 
crown that was approved in 1849 at the proposal of  Lajos Kossuth, because it 
represented the changes during later revolutions as well as in 1849. It was under 
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these armorial bearings that the republic was proclaimed on November 16, 1918, 
following the collapse of  the Habsburg Empire, and the same happened when 
it was proclaimed again on February 1, 1946 and during the 1956 Revolution. 
Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of  parliamentary deputies (228 out of  
291) voted for the arms with the royal crown at the top. Their principal argument 
was that the crown represented the continuity of  Hungarian statehood and not 
royal power. A similar question that demanded a decision was to set the date of  
the official state holiday. There were three candidates: March 15, commemorating 
1848, August 20, recognizing the merits of  the founder of  the state, Saint 
Stephen, and October 23, commemorating the outbreak of  the 1956 Revolution. 
In line with the government’s proposal and the decision on the coat of  arms, the 
deputies declared Saint Stephen’s work, the creation of  the Christian Hungarian 
state in the year 1000, as the most important event in Hungarian history, and this 
was made the symbol of  the Hungarian state and nation.
Most liberals, socialists and “Young Democrats” chose March 15, because 
they considered it to better symbolize modern Hungarian statehood, national 
unity and democracy. The parliamentary decision, however, did not mean that 
March 15 and October 23 would not have been recognized as state and national 
holidays, days of  rest. It is reasonable to say that the majority of  lawmakers 
showed a good sense of  history. March 15 and October 23, despite their 
emotional and moral significance, are commemorations of  what were, at least 
in the short term, failures. By contrast, August 20 is the symbol of  unmatched 
continuity and unmatched persistence. Few statesmen anywhere in the world can 
boast what Saint Stephen can: his creation, the state of  Hungary, has survived 
for more than a thousand years.
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